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PLOTINUS ON THE ARTICULATION OF BEING
Steven K. Strange
§1 Introduction
Ennead vi.2, the second book of the treatise On the Genera o f Being (vi.1-3 [42-44]) presents itself as 
Plotinus’ official account of the structure of the second Hypostasis, i.e. Intellect (voO?) or Being, what 
corresponds in his metaphysical universe to Plato’s realm of Ideas or Formst For in vi.l, the first book of 
the treatise, Plotinus criticizes and rejects all competing conceptions of the nature of being, as answers to 
what he takes to be the central question of ontology, i.e. Plato's question at Sophist 242c, ‘what are the 
number and kinds of beings?’.^ He devotes detailed criticisms to the Peripatetic view (i.e. the ten categories 
of Aristotle) and that of the Stoics (the so-called Stoic ‘categories’), because they are the only theories of 
the nature of Being besides Plato’s that see it as consisting in a number of genera or kinds, which he argues 
is the only coherent way to conceive of Being (vi.l.l,l-14).3 Having refuted the Peripatetic and Stoic 
theories in vi.l, he turns in the opening lines of vi.2 to developing his own view of Being, which he 
intends to be in agreement with Plato’s (vi.2.1.1-5; cf. vi.3.1,1-2 where he claims to have successfully 
completed this task). Indeed, the account of the ‘genera of Being’ that he gives in vi.2 is closely modelled 
on Plato’s discussion of the so-called ‘greatest kinds’ or megista genê in the Sophist (248e-259b).
Now Plotinus considers the correct ontological position to be not only that there are a number of 
different genera of Being, but that these are at the same time principles (άρχαΐ) of Being/* This is a clear 
reference to one of the homs of the sixth aporta of Metaphysics B (995b27-29, 998a20-bl4): are the 
elements and principles of Being to be taken to be genera or to be primary (material) constituents? 
Plotinus’ favored alternative, that they are genera, corresponds to the position attributed by Aristotle to the 
Platonists (cf. e.g. Metaphysics Δ3 ad fin.), and this helps explain Plotinus’ emphasis on its agreement 
with Plato. (These connections provide a good example of the meaning of Porphyry's remark that the
1 Vi. 1-3 is the Plotinian treatise known to Longinus (apud Porphyry, Vita 19.26) as On Being (Περί 
του övtos): cf. P. Henry, Les états du texte de Plotin (Paris, 1938), pp.24-25 and O. Hoppe, Die Gene in 
Plotins Enn.VI.2 (Diss. Göttingen, 1965), pp.79-80. Plotinus did not give titles to his works (Vita 
4.16-19), but Longinus’ title, presumably due to Amelius, from whom he got his copy (Vita 19.22-23, 
20.5-9), is precise.
^I. 3.4,2-6 treats this as the fundamental question of dialectic, but Plotinus like Plato sees dialectic as the 
science that is concerned with Being. Cf. also Philebus 17b and, for Aristotle, Physics A2 184b 15-25 and 
Metaphysics A7 988M6-17 for the question of the number and kind of the principles (άρχαΟ, and 
Metaphysics Z l, 1028b2-7 for the number and kind of beings. Plotinus is alluding to the Meta. Z 
passage at vi.l. 1,3-4.
^For refutation of other views of the nature of Being, he refers to the works of the ‘ancients’ (this is what 
is meant by ol μ ετ’ αύτοί, sc. ol πάνυ παλαιοί, at vi.1.1,4-5) i.e. to the Sophist itself and to the 
Metaphysics and the first book of the Physics (see the previous note). I have discussed the passage in 
detail in the first chapter of my dissertation, Plotinus’ Treatise Or  the. Genera of Being (The University of 
Texas at Austin, 1981); cf. also pp.964-965 of my “Plotinus, Porphyry, and the Neoplatonic Interpretation 
of the Categories ”, in H. Temporini and W. Haase, eds., Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt, Teil 
11.36.1(1987).
4 This is argued in vi.2.2,1-20, to be discussed in §3 below. Note the formal division of various possible 
alternative views of the genera-principles relation at vi.2.1,5-16 (cf. Hoppe, p.43). For the connection with 
the sixth aporta of Metaphysics B, cf. my dissertation, pp.9-20, and Klaus Wurm, Substanz und Qualität: 
Ein Beitrag zur Interpretation der plotinischen Traktate VI.12 und 3 (Berlin, 1973), p.225-227. Plotinus 
uses the term άρχαί where Aristotle speaks of στοιχεία καί άρχαΐ (Meta. 998b22-24). I have further 
argued in ch.l of my dissertation that Plotinus takes the two positions distinguished at vi.l. 1,13-14 to 
represent the homs of the seventh aporta of B (995b29-31,998bl4-999a23), i.e. whether, given that genera 
have precedence over constituents, it is the highest genera or the lowest species that should be taken as 
prior. The latter alternative (here referred to by the phrase αύτά τά δντα τφ γένει τοσαΟτα, “that 
beings themselves are [merely] so many in genus”) will then represent the Aristotelian alternative, refuted 
in v i.l.1-24. Cf. also my “Plotinus, Porphyry, and the Neoplatonic Interpretation of the Categories ” (see 
preceding note), p.958.
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whole of the Metaphysics is condensed into the Enneads, Vita 14.5-7) But Plotinus’ argument for this 
claim, and his attempt in the later chapters of vi.2 to explain its meaning in toms of Plato’s megista gene.
is very difficult to follow. Gerhard Nebel,^ writing in 1929, did not hesitate to declare it wholly 
incoherent. Despite his many useful insights on points of detail, Otfried Hoppe in his Göttingen 
dissertation of 1965^ also found himself unable to comprehend the structure of Plotinus’ argument. Klaus 
Wurm, in a critical yet sympathetic study of the treatise published in 1973?  was able to avoid a conclusion 
similar to Nebel’s only by interpreting Plotinus’ claim that the genera of Being are simultaneously 
principles of Being as a conscious paradox, ultimately inaccessible to discursive understanding.
Similar views can be found in commentators writing in English. A.C. Lloyd, who has done more than 
any other scholar to further the understanding of this fundamental treatise of Plotinus, argued in a seminal 
1956 article that the conception of the structure of Being which emerges from the key argument of 
vi.2.19-20 is, in the last analysis, an unsuccessful attempt to reconcile Aristotelian logic with a Platonic 
metaphysics which can only rest on a mystical basis.8 More recently, in an exchange with Richard 
Sorabji, Lloyd has reiterated the position that Plotinus’ conception of νσήσι? or non-discursive thought is 
that of the apprehension of a simple nature that transcends rationality and therefore philosophical 
formulation.^ A similar view has been suggested by Andrew Smith, in a brief but important discussion.10 
Smith argues that Plotinus’ use of the concept of potency (δύναμι?, τό δυνάμει) to explain the 
interrelation of the Ideas in voû? in the argument of vi.2.20 can at best be analogical, given that Plotinus 
has explicitly banned potency from the intelligible realm (ii.5.3,4-19; v.9.10,14), and that this is 
symptomatic of his inability to give a literal description of intelligible reality. ^  Most recently, Gary *I
5 P loti ns Kategorien der intellgiblen Welt (Tübingen, 1929), cf. also his ‘Terminologisches 
Untersuchungen zu ούσία und δν bei Plotin”, Hermes 65 (1930), pp.422-455. Nebel’s work is still quite 
useful despite its lack of charity in interpreting Plotinus’ arguments.
6Above, n.l. Cf. p.81: “Es ist also deutlich, daß die Lösung des Problems [of vi.2.19,1-18] nicht auf 
der Begriffsebene erfolgen kann, auf der das Problem gestellt wird...”; p.83: “Die eigentliche Lösung 
verzichtet nun [in vi.2.21] vollends auf rational nachvollziehbare Argumente”. Hoppe’s introduction (pp.l- 
5) provides a devastating critique of earlier German commentary on vi.2.
7 Above, n.4. See the incisive review of Wurm by T.A. Szlezák, Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen 227 
(1975), pp.216-225, esp. p.223.
^“Neoplatonic Logic and Aristotelian Logic I-Π” Phronesis 1 (1956-57), pp.58-72 and 146-160, at 
pp. 147-150. Cf. esp. his conclusion (p.150): “Plotinus tries to go down both paths at once [that of 
Aristotelian logic and that of Platonic metaphysics], not unconsciously but because in the last resort he 
could accept antinomies o f the understanding, for they would be eclipsed by another kind of insight.” (My 
emphasis.)
^“Non-Propositional Thought in Plotinus”, Phronesis 31 (1986), pp.258-265: cf. esp. p.263: “...it [i.e. 
the experience of awareness of voO?] must be indescribable”. Lloyd is responding in this article to 
Sorabji’s “Myths about Non-Propositional Thought” (ch.10 of his Time, Creation and the Continuum 
[London, 1983]; an earlier version appeared in M. Schofield and M.C. Nussbaum, eds.. Language and 
Logos: Studies Presented to G.EL Owen [Cambridge, 1982]). Sorabji, who holds that Plotinus thinks of 
non-discursive thought as propositional in nature, criticizes Lloyd’s earlier essay “Non-Discursive Thought: 
An Enigma of Greek Philosophy”, Proceedings o f the Aristotelian Society n.s. 70 (1969-70), pp.261-274.
I argued for a view similar to Sorabji’s in chapter 5 of my dissertation, on the basis of Plotinus’ use of the 
notion of the κοινωνία των γένων or συμπλοκή είδών of the Sophist (251de, 259e) to explicate the 
structure of the intelligible world in vi.2. In light of the arguments in Lloyd’s 1986 article, however, the 
issue clearly requires further examination: cf. §2 and §4 fin. below.
^ ‘Potentiality and the Problem of Plurality in the Intelligible World”, in H.J. Blumenthal and R.A. 
Markus, eds.. Neoplatonism and Early Christian Thought: Essays in Honour o f AH . Armstrong (London, 
1981), pp.99-105. The difficulty with which Smith is concerned was first raised by Armstrong in his 
“Eternity, Life and Movement in Plotinus’ Accounts of NoOç”, in Le néoplatonisme (Colloques 
internationaux du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Royaumont, 9-13 juin 1969).
1 lCf. Smith, p.102: “In a sense all talk of the intelligible is by analogy”; p.104: “ ...it is clear from the 
end of the chapter [i.e. iv.9.5, on the connection of which with vi.2.20, see below §4] that the idea of 
plurality in unity remains inaccessible to normal reasoning ” (my emphasis). I have myself expressed a
(Note continued on next page)
Gürtler has attempted to defend Plotinus’ position in vi.2, arguing that Lloyd and others have 
misunderstood the argument of vi.2.20 at crucial points, especially in its use of the concept of potency. 12
I do not think, however, that Guttler has properly understood the argument in question either. Nor has 
he or any other commentator succeeded in making clear how this argument fits into its context, i.e. as 
explaining how the megista gene are supposed to be at once genera and principles of Being in the way that 
Plotinus wants to claim they are (cf. vi.2.19,12-17, to which §2.19-27 looks forward), and how this relates 
to the general problem of the complexity of intelligible reality in Plotinus and the relationship of the Ideas 
to one another. If the argument is properly seen in its context, however, I think that some of its 
obscurities can be mitigated.
§2 The Complexity o f Being and Thought
First, however, it will be necessary to confront directly Lloyd’s thesis about the nature of non- 
discursive thought in Plotinus. For if Lloyd is correct in claiming that Plotinus thinks of non-discursive 
thought as necessarily directed upon pure simples as its objects, and in particular upon Being as an 
undifferentiated totum s im u lé  then this will preclude any possibility of taking the argument of vi.2.19-20 
and, more generally, Plotinus’ account of the structure of the intelligible as serious ontology. For in that 
case he can at best be describing how we must think of Being, and not attempting to give an account of 
how Being in itself is. Lloyd’s challenge is a powerful one, for there are certainly texts in vi.2 itself that 
seem to say that this is the way things are.1^  There is, however, another and better way of reading these 
texts that sees them as making a different and deeper point, and one that unlike Lloyd’s is consistent with 
Plotinus’ overall project in vi.2. My argument for this interpretation must be postponed to the end of the 
paper. For now, I shall restrict myself to independent reasons for thinking that Lloyd’s thesis does not fît 
Plotinus’ view of the nature of νοήσι? or non-discursive thought.
For Plotinus, as for the Plato of the Republic, νοήσι? is the sort of thought that is directed upon 
Being, the nature of reality as it is in itself, and voOs is the name of the associated cognitive faculty.15 
Plato thought of the content or objects of this sort of thought as a multiplicity of Ideas or Forms. He 
obviously faced difficulties in explaining how the Ideas were related to one another. This is not surprising, 
given that the Theory of Ideas clearly is a development of Parmenides’ views about Being, 16 and
view similar to the first of these statements in my Aufstieg und Niedergang article (above, n.3), 
pp.972-974. Indeed, it is obvious that talk about the intelligible, like any sort of technical language, must 
essentially involve metaphor or analogy, since its terms must be adapted by extension from ordinary 
speech, which is intended for use only about sensible reality and everyday experience. Plotinus, however, is 
committed to something much stronger than this, since he holds that the sensible world is itself somehow 
metaphysically an image or reflection (the term is precise: cf. vi.2.22,33 ff.) of the ‘higher’ intelligible 
world. But I do not think this needs to be interpreted in such a way as to preclude from the outset that 
Plotinus could ever in any way adequately describe what he is talking about 
12“The Origin of Genoa: Ennead VI.2 [43] 20”, Dionysius 12 (1988), pp.3-15. Gürtler unfortunately 
does not refer to Smith’s article.
^Lloyd’s 1969 essay argues only for the former, weaker claim, his 1986 article for the stronger one. 
l^The strongest support t o  Lloyd’s thesis is provided by vi.2.3,21-32 (Lloyd 1986, p.265), which has as 
a very close parallel v.9.8,19-9,2 (note the emphasis in both passages on the fact that it is our intellectual 
activity that is responsible for dividing up voOs). He can also cite from vi.2: 6.18-20 (soul's self­
contemplation is the cause of its appearing many—supposed to be analogous to the case with voOs), 7.7-23J 
(it is the observer who finds voOs not one) and 8.1 (assuming that both the latter passages refer, like 
vi.2.3,21-32 and v.9.8,19-9,2 to the activity of our intellect). Cf. also iii.7 [45] 3,7 ff., the next treatise 
chronologically after vi.1-3, and also concerned with the meeista pené.
15No0s is therefore stronger than merely “thought”, and νοήσι^ than merely “thinking” (pace Lloyd 
1986, pp.262-263). It is not the name for thought in general, either, since not every case of thinking 
involves νοήσι?. (This point is unaffected by Plotinus’ thesis concerning the ‘undescended intellect’, that 
our soul is always in contact with the higher voOs, since he nevertheless does not think that we are always 
using it.) Nous' rather stands for necessarily true thought that is insight into the nature of things. But I 
will follow Lloyd’s practice of speaking of ‘thought’ and ‘thinking’ for VCDs' and νοήσι?· 
l^Cf. for example the Parmenidean language at Rep. v, 477a.
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Parmenides had disallowed any sort of multiplicity within Being. The Phaedo (especially the Affinity 
Argument), which neats the Ideas as metaphysical simples, appears to leave no room for relations among 
Ideas, and Plato’s remarks in Republic vi about the relation of the Idea of the Good to other Ideas are 
obscure. Plato’s official attempt to resolve the difficulty in the Sophist (forecast in the Parmenides ) by 
allowing internal relations among Ideas involves an explicit rejection of an important part of Parmenides’ 
argument concerning the nature of Being. ^  Hence the multiplicity of the Ideas, as the fundamentally real 
natures, seems essential to Plato’s version of Platonism; and moreover Plotinus is aware of this. It is then 
a point on which he would wish to be in harmony with his philosophical hero. V. 1.4,39 in fact asserts 
without any sort of qualification that the objects of thought must differ among themselves, though no direct 
argument is offered for this there.
But there is another and perhaps related reason why a Platonist would want to find essential 
multiplicity in the intelligible realm, namely that knowledge of an Idea or Form involves knowing its 
definition, which states its essence or what it is. There is no reason to think that Plato ever abandoned this 
Socratic view, and Plotinus explicitly endorses it in his treatise on dialectic (i.3.4,3-6). But a definition is 
a complex statement and hence presumably so too is what it defines, i.e. the Idea. In any case Plotinus 
would certainly think so, since he adopts Aristotle’s view of definition through genus and differentia.^ 
And there are numerous texts which show that he does think so. Thus at vi.6 [34] 16,21-22, interpreting 
the Aristotelian evidence that Plato held the Ideas to be numbers, he considers the hypothesis that Man 
Itself is a dyad, viz. Rational + Animal. At vi.7 [38] 5,1, in the most important discussion of the origin of 
the Ideas, the Idea of Man is again said to be a λόγο?, and at vi.8 [39] 17,15 and v.3 [49] 10,29, all Ideas 
are λόγοι. In vi.7.8 (17 ff.) and 10 (11 ff.), the eternal generation of the Ideas within voO? is described as 
the generation of the Idea-Numbers, i.e. as a series of increasingly internally complex objects: 10.11-12 
says explicitly that it is the internal definitional complexity of ideas that is meant—the Idea is constituted 
by its differentiae. There is similar evidence in vi.1-3. Vi.3.15,24 ff. speaks of three levels of λόγοι: the 
sensible λόγο? of Socrates, i.e. his immanent form, the spermatic logos which produces this and of which 
it is an image, and the λόγο? of which this is an image, clearly the Idea of Man. At vi.2.10,3, each Form 
(el So?) as a part of Being (conceived as the One Being of Parmenides hypothesis II) is said to be a 
multiplicity: this must refer to its multiplicity as a λόγο?. Vi.2.21,47 says that each etSo? is both one 
and many.
The passages from vi.7 just cited indicate that in thinking of the Platonic Ideas as a structured hierarchy 
of internally complex definitional entities, Plotinus is thinking of the Animal Itself of the Timaeus (30cd, 
39e). At Timaeus 39e, voO? is said to ‘see’ the Ideas in this animal. This shows that Plato thinks of the 
Animal Itself, which is of course the generic Idea of Animal, as internally complex.^ Hence Plotinus is 
not wrong to take Plato’s view to be that voO? has internally complex objects. But Lloyd rejects this on 
the grounds that Plotinus elsewhere rules out that in thinking the Ideas voO? thinks propositions.^ The 
reference is to the first chapter of v.5 [32], where in the course of an argument for the thesis that ‘the Ideas 
are not outside intellect’, Plotinus refit tes various alternative views of the relation between voO? and the 
νοητά. One of these views is that the νοητά should be taken to stand to voO? as the propositions of
* ^ Plotinus is quite aware of this point: cf. v.1.8,14-26. At v.9.6,3 (cf. Smith p.99) he endorses 
Anaxagoras’ modification (Bl) of Parmenides B8.5 (Being is όμοΟ πάν): πάντα Sè όμοϋ έκεΐ (in 
voO?) καί ούδέν ήττον διακεκριμένα (cf. lines 8-9: δ voO? έσ η ν  δμοΟ πάντα καί αδ οδχ δμοΟ, 
and vi.4.14,4-5). That is, he sees the importance of Anaxagoras’ innovation as lying in his emphasis on 
the that fact that voO? is plural just as much as it is one. It should be noted that v.9 is important as 
Plotinus’ earliest discussion of the nature of Being (assuming what is usually assumed, but the text does 
not in fact say, that the list of the first twenty-one treatises Porphyry gives at Vita 4.22-65 is in 
chronological order). V.9 concentrates in large part on traditional problems concerning the Theory of Ideas.
l^Cf. Lloyd 1956-57 (n.9 above). I.3.4.2-6 includes giving genus-differentiae definitions in the task of 
dialectic.
^V i.7 .3 9 ,9 ff. similarly argues, from considerations of perfection, that voO? must be able to think all 
Ideas simultaneously.
20Lloyd 1986, pp.261-262. This is directed against Sorabji, who argues that for Plotinus the objects of 
voO? are propositions.
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Peripatetic or Stoic semantic theory do to the mind that knows them.21 He rejects this view on the 
grounds that propositions are entities that are distinct from what they are about, so in this case at best could 
be about Ideas, and thus not be Ideas themselves. Plotinus’ argument here is in no way inconsistent, 
however, with the view that Ideas, as the objects of thought of νοδ?, are themselves definitionally complex 
entities. He is only saying that νοδ? does not think propositions about these entities: rather it thinks the 
Ideas themselves, they just are its thoughts.22
I think that what has been said so far is sufficient to undermine the plausibility of Lloyd’s thesis, but it 
also should be remarked that some of the passages he cites in support of his thesis do not in fact seem to be 
consistent with it. He refers a number of times, for instance, to v.8 [31] 4-6, a remarkable passage about 
the nature of intelligible world where Plotinus begins with one of his favorite Platonic texts, the 
description of the δπερουράνιο? τόπο? of Phaedrus 247ce, and ends with a famous remark about 
Egyptian hieroglyphics. But v.8.4 concerns not what our intellects but what gods, i.e. divine intellects, 
‘see’ in the intelligible, and it appears definitely to attribute internal complexity to the objects of their 
knowledge. For the gods are said to see all Ideas manifest in every Idea (lines 6-8, cf. 11: έξεχει 8’ ev 
έκάσίίι) άλλο, έμφαίνει 8è καί πάντα, and the reference to Lynceus at lines 25-27). Chapters 5 and 6, 
which discuss the knowledge of voO? (here called σοφία or ‘wisdom’), i.e. divine knowledge and the 
paradigm of knowledge,2^ indeed deny that this knowledge is propositional (5.20;24 cf. Lloyd p.260), and 
our problem in understanding the nature of this wisdom (4.48 ff.) is said to be that we think of knowledge 
as a collection of theorems, i.e. propositions, but as we have seen this cuts no ice for Lloyd: indeed we 
shall see that Plotinus thinks that the notion of a science as a system of propositions is a helpful and 
illuminating analogy for understanding the structure of intellect The point of the reference to hieroglyphics 
at 6.11, which has not usually been properly understood, is to suggest the possibility of a knowledge which 
does not consist in making inferences. Inferences will not be necessary in direct knowledge of Ideas 
precisely because knowing one Idea essentially involves knowing its relations to other Ideas—as we shall 
this notion plays a key role in the argument of vi.2.20. The same conception is at work in vi.7.2: 
knowledge of things in the sensible world involves knowing their causes or explanations, as Aristotle had 
said (An. Post. B2), but this is knowledge of an entity distinct from the explanandum: knowledge of the 
contents of intellect is not like this, because each of them contains its cause within itself. This is not to 
say that each Idea is its own complete cause: Plotinus is willing to assert self-causation only of the 
transcendent One, and then only in the context of responding to the objection that otherwise the One will be 
by chance (cf. vi.8.7 ff.). Rather it means that Ideas are (as in the Sophist ) internally related to one 
another. We will return to this claim in §4 below, when we discuss vi.2.20.
§3 The Genera as the Principles o f Being
It is well-known that in vi.2 Plotinus identifies the genera of the intelligible world as the five ‘kinds’ 
discussed by Plato in the Sophist, i.e. Being, Motion, Rest, Same and Different.25 For this he was 
strongly criticized by F.M. Comford,26 who thought that Plotinus had been misled by the mention of 
Being, Motion, and Rest at Timaeus 35a and 37a2? into misunderstanding the meaning of Plato’s text at 
Sophist 254d4-5, and taking it to say that the five items in question, instead of merely being very
21 Lines 33-34: προτάσει? or άξιώματα (which are a kind of λεπτά, according to the Stoics). 
Plotinus has in mind, perhaps among others, Longinus’ interpretation of the Timaeus (cf. Syrian us In 
Meta. 105.29-30).
22Hence Lloyd is right against Sorabji that the thought of voö? is non-propositional, but not that it is 
non-complex. Presumably Plotinus accepts that discursive thought is propositional in nature.
23piotinus is thinking of the ‘true knowledge’ of Phaedrus 247e2.
24The reference here is again to Longinus' view.
25vi.2.7-8, which argue that these are five distinct highest genera of intelligibles, are closely modelled on 
Sophist 254-256 (but cf. nn.38-39 below). In §§9-18, he argues at length that anything else that might 
have been taken to be a genus of Being, including the principal Aristotelian categories, are either not genera 
or at least not highest genera.
26Plato’s Theory o f Knowledge: The Theaetetus and Sophist c f Plato (London, 1934), pp.273-278.
2?It would have been more to the point for Comford to have referred to Parmenides 145-146. Plotinus 
considers the second hypothesis of the Parmenides to be about the world of Ideas.
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important Ideas, are the ‘categories’ of intelligibles, i.e. the summa genera of Ideas. There are a number of 
things that can be said against Comford in defense of Plotinus. First, it is not at all clear that Comford’s 
translation of Plato’s sentence is to be preferred to Plotinus’ interpretation,^ which in any case is 
certainly not impossible. Plotinus’ interpretation has the advantage of giving the Eleatic Stranger an 
answer to the question that he asks of all earlier philosophers, viz. how many and what entities there 
are^9—clearly this is the principal motive lying behind Plotinus’ reading. Further, it is not at all clear that 
Plotinus wants to make the claim that Comford sees him as making (and that he has usually been seen to 
be making) that Being, Motion, Rest, Same and Different are ül£ summa genera of Ideas, in the sense of a 
catégorial classification of Ideas, an exhaustive list of widest genera, under some one of which any Idea 
whatever is to be found. But understanding what else might be meant by Plotinus’ claim that Being, 
Motion, Rest, Same and Different are ‘the genera of Being’ will involve interpreting his claim in vi.2.2 
that they are not only the genera but also the principles of Being, i.e. how he attempts to defend what he 
sees as the Platonist response to the aporiai of Metaphysics B.
Plotinus begins his discussion of the genera of Being in vi.2.1 by reiterating two points that he had 
established in vi.l, namely that (1) there must be a multiplicity of (kinds of) beings, not just one, and (2) 
when we say this, we are following Plato (Timaeus 27d-28a) in talking about the real world of intelligible 
Being, not die seeming being of the sensible world, which is really Becoming (his theory of the categories 
of which he will present in vi.3). He gives no argument for (1), only refers to arguments given by Plato 
and others (1.13-14). This of course is an allusion to Plato’s and Aristotle’s refutations of Parmenides’ 
thesis that there is only one thing.30 (2) is in effect a rejection of the search for a system of ‘categories’, in 
the sense of a complete classification of everything ‘that there is’. Plotinus is concerned only with the 
highest degree of being.3 1
Vi.2.2 begins with the question: how is it that Being is not one? Plotinus’ reply is that it is both 
one and many (again, he is thinking of the One Being of Parmenides hypothesis II, which is said to be a 
whole of parts). This claim is unargued here, but if pressed he would presumably defend it by appeal to his 
view that a higher degree of being goes along with a higher degree of unity (cf. e.g. vi.2.5,3-5), so that the 
highest degree of being must have the highest degree of unity compatible with its being Being. 
Parmenides’ thesis having already been refuted, this cannot be pure unity, but must be the unity of a single 
thing that contains an internal multiplicity (cf. 2.3 here: τ ι ποικίλον £v τά πολλά el? έν έχον). 
His next question (2.3 ff.) is: given that this is so, and that there must be genera of being (established in 
vi.1.1, presupposed at vi.2.1,5 ff.), what must the situation then be? His answer has two parts: (1) there 
are a number of distinct highest genera, i.e. there cannot be a single genus under which they all fall; 
(2)therefore these genera must combine or ‘mix’ to constitute the whole of Being (i.e. intelligible 
reality). 32 (1) does not receive an argument until lines 32 ff.: namely that for X to be a genus there must 
be something else apart from X, for being a genus means having species, which must involve differentiae
28Word order would seem to favor Campbell’s rendering, “The most important kinds are those which we 
have just been considering...”, which yields Plotinus’ interpretation. The presence of the article with 6v 
and its absence with μέγιστα is not decisive concerning which is subject and which predicate. Ά ττα  at 
254c4 might be a case of deliberate understatement
29çf# above, p .l with n.2.
30Henry and Schwyzer’s reference in their apparatus here to Sophist 244-245 is correct, but the 
Parmenides reference should be to 142c ff. (the One Being a whole of parts) instead of 141e. Physics A3 
should also be cited (see below). On die same point cf. vi.l. 1,4-8: the ancients had rejected the view that 
there was only one being δ η  πολλά καί tv  τοΧ? νοητοί? έώρων, because they saw that there must be 
multiplicity even in the case of intelligible being. Again it is quite clear that Plotinus cannot accept that 
the realm of voO? is in any sense a pure unity.
3 1 Porphyry’s rehabilitation of the Aristotelian categories as the genera of Being is probably to be taken 
as a contribution to the former enterprise, and hence need not be seen as directly competing with Plotinus’ 
argument in vi.2.
32nence we have to distinguish (though Plotinus does not always do so) between Being as one among 
the five genera of Being and the Being which is constituted by these genera, i.e. the realm of voO? or Ideas 
as a whole. Officially, the name for the latter is ούσία (the view of ii.6.1, init.): I shall call it 
‘intelligible reality’. (Hoppe p.30 is wrong to deny that the view discussed at ii.6.1, init. is Plotinus’).
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that do not themselves fall under X. The differentiae must come from outside the genus (cf. vi.2.19,2-4, 
where the point is made explicitly).^ The reason for the “therefore” in (2) is apparently that this is the 
only way to save the requirement that intelligible reality be a single thing that is also many. To say that 
the genera of Being are also principles of Being thus means that they are simultaneously genera and 
constituents of Being.34 Plotinus is aware that this sounds extremely odd, not to say incomprehensible. 
Before we examine this issue, however, further comment on (1) is called for.
Lines 2.43-46 add a further argument for (1), the claim that there cannot be merely a single genus of 
Being, which is unfortunately quite obscure. It runs as follows:-^
Also, because it is not possible to say that just any one of them [the genera] whatever taken 
by itself is either a being or a substance. If someone says it is a being, he will be saying this 
in virtue of the fact that being is accidental to it, as if he were to say that substance is white, 
for he would not be saying that it is precisely (δπερ) what white is.
The same point is made at 8.43-49:
These [Motion, Rest, Same and Different] are primary genera, since you do not predicate 
anything in the essence of them. For you will predicate Being of them, for they are beings, 
but not as their genus, for they are not precisely what a being is (δπερ δν τι). Nor is Being 
predicated essentially of Motion or Rest, for they are not species of Being. Some beings are 
species of Being, others participate in Being. Να- does Being participate in these things as its 
genera, for they do not lie above it, nor are they prior to Being.
That is, the other four genera are beings, but not species or instances of Being: it is not predicated in the 
essence of them. (This is all that is meant by saying that being is ‘accidental’ to them (2.44), not that they 
are contingently beings.) But what non-question-begging ground can Plotinus have for claiming this? The 
use of ‘white’ in the first passage and δπερ δν τι, “precisely what a being is”, in the second suggests that 
Plotinus has in mind Aristotle’s argument against Parmenides at Physics A3, 186a25-bl4. This is 
perhaps not much help, given the difficulty and obscurity of the Aristotle passage, but the point there 
seems to be at least that Parmenides is unable to maintain the reality of true predication (Aristotle’s 
example is “This is white”). Now Plotinus clearly wants to insist that there are true predications in the 
case of intelligible reality: for instance that voO? and intelligible ούσία are active and alive (i.e. 
predication of Motion of Being: 13.3-4, 15.4-10; cf. Sophist 248e-249a). But then Motion, as the 
activity and life of Being, cannot either be a species or a genus of it.
To return to the claim that the genera are also the constituents of Being: Plotinus clearly has in mind a 
reading of the Sophist according to which not only discourse but also intelligible reality is constituted by 
the κοινωνία of the Greatest Kinds.36 Such a reading is not implausible if Plato is taken to claim that 
the megista genê are indeed the highest of the ideas, i.e. as ontologically primary among Ideas. Other ideas 
would be thought of as the results of the blending of the Kinds (hence Plotinus’ talk of ‘mixture’ in
33This is Aristotle’s view (Topics 144a36-b3). In the face of criticism by C. Rutten (“Le genre et la 
différence selon Plotin”, in En hommage à Léon Graulich [Liège, 1957], pp.639-648), Lloyd abandoned the 
claim of his 1956-57 paper (pp.68-69; based on a failure to distinguish ούσία from δν at vi.2.5, fin.; cf. 
previous note) that Plotinus rejected this principle (cf. “Genus, Species and Ordered Series in Aristotle”, 
Phronesis 7 (1962), at pp.84-85).
3*Cf. 2.9-10: “ ...all of them must together constitute a single nature, and the intelligible cosmos, 
which we call Being, must be a composite of all of them”; 13-17: “They will be principles, if Being is 
composed in this way out of many things and the whole of Being is constituted by them. If instead there 
were a number of things of which Being was composed, and all of them together combined to produce the 
whole of Being, but they did not have other things [reading dXX’ (Creuzer) or dXXa at 15: alia, Ficino] 
falling under them, they would then have been principles of Being, but not genera of Being—as, for 
example, if one were to make the sensible object be composed of the four elements, fire and so on”.
3 ^  All translations from vi.2 are my own.
3^Cf. vi.2.21,55: ή πάντων èv èvl δντων dlov συμπλοκή καί σύνθεσι? voOç è<m.
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2.19-26, cf. below, §4 init.). The difficulties with this reading and with what Plotinus says about it are far 
too complex to discuss fully here. The following two problems however may be briefly noted: ^
(i) Not only intelligible reality as a whole but also each Idea will according to Plotinus be an active, 
stable nature that is the same as yet different from^S every other Idea. Hence each Idea will contain 
‘portions’ of all five Genera. This apparently precludes any Idea falling under any one Genus. Indeed, 8.26 
with 41 actually asserts that every derivative Idea is an instance of all five. But Plotinus insists that the 
megista genê are true genera, and so must have their own species (and individuals!) falling under them (e.g. 
2.6-8).
(ii) If the Genera are. themselves Ideas, as it seems that they should be, they will necessarily each 
participate in every other.39 But clearly none of them can fall under any other (2.6: μηδέν 8έ ίλλο ίπτ’ 
áXXo).
All that (ii) actually shows is that participating in an idea does not amount to falling under it: but this 
is clear independently from 8.46-47 (translated above). Now 10.22-27 asserts that Being (i.e. the Genus) is 
not the genus of every Form but only of “the ‘being’ that belongs to each Form”. This could be taken to 
imply that the species falling under the Genera are not Ideas at all but constituents of them—the 
contributions to them from the ‘mixture’ of Being, Motion, Rest, and so forth. However, as already noted, 
8.26 and 8.41 state that every Idea, apart from the Genera themselves, is an instance of each of them (δν 
τ ι,κ ιν ή σ ι?  τ ι  and so forth). This suggests the following hypothesis to resolve the above two 
difficulties.* 4^ Saying that each Idea is an δν τι,κινήσι? τι, etc. presumably means that they are to be 
identified with the individuals (άτομα) that are said to fall under each genus at 2.8.41 They will be 
composed of the species of the Genera (= the being, motion, rest, sameness and difference that belong to 
each Idea). It will not be the case, then, that the classes of individuals that fall under each genus will be 
exclusive of each other: on the contrary, these classes will coincide (though their species will not 
overlap).4^ But it should be noted that Plotinus does not think of the Aristotelian categories as mutually 
exclusive either cf. vi.3.14,19-20 with vi.l. 12,27-30, which imply that the same item can fall into a 
number of different categories.4^
§4 The Articulation o f Being: v i.2 .19-20
Unfortunately, Plotinus does not directly discuss the problem of how we are to understand the hierarchy 
of Ideas in terms of genus-species relations. He is more concerned with another difficulty that is raised by 
his claim in vi.2.2 that the genera of Being are also its principles. This is the one mentioned in 2.19-26:
3^They were both clearly articulated by Nebel, who thought them insoluble: cf. n.6 above.
38jsfote that Plotinus sees Sameness as consisting not in the identity of an Idea with itself, as Plato does 
(Soph. 254dl5) but in the sameness of the Ideas with each other, i.e. the fact that together they constitute a 
single nature. Sameness in this sense is for him the principal factor in the eternity of the Ideas: cf. ΙΠ.7.3 
and my “Plotinus on the Nature of Eternity and Time”, to appear in Lawrence Schrenk, ed., Aristotle in 
Late Antiquity, in the series Studies in Philosophy and the History o f Philosophy (Jude P. Dougherty, 
general editor); also J.E. McGuire and S.K. Strange, “An Annotated Translation of Plotinus, Ennead ΠΙ.7, 
On Eternity and Time ”, Ancient Philosophy 8 (1988), at p.252.
39Note that Plotinus apparently allows Motion to mix with Rest, thus taking up Plato’s hint at Soph. 
256b, as perhaps he should. On this point, cf. C.D.C. Reeve, “Motion, Rest and Dialectic in the 
Sophist ”, Archiv fü r Geschichte der Philosophie 67 (1985), pp.47-63. All five Genera are thus all- 
pervasive in the sense of the Sophist.
4^This hypothesis was suggested to me by Michael Frede.
4 ^This is consistent with vi.7.9, 34 ff., where Ideas are particular (καθ’ έκαστον) intellects that are 
ultimate (έσχατον) in the hierarchy of genus and species.
42A difficulty for this hypothesis is that Plotinus seems to conceive of some Ideas as falling under some 
Genera rather than others, though perhaps under more than one: cf. 13.23-26, where Number is said to 
result from the mixture of Motion with Rest, whereas Magnitude is an instance of Motion alone or results 
from it.
4 3The vi.3.14 passage just repeats what is said at Categories lla37-38, but this passage of the 
Categories is probably an interpolation. Lloyd 1962 (above n.33), pp.84 n.3 is wrong to see the Plotinus 
passage as merely dialectical instead of official doctrine.
Accordingly, since we claim that there are certain genera of Being, and that these same items 
are also principles of Being, shall we then produce the whole of Being by mixing together the 
genera along with everything falling under each of them, thus producing a mixture of all the 
beings? But in that case each of them will be in potency, not in act, nor will each thing itself 
be pure. Shall we let the genera be, and mix together the particulars? Then what will the 
genera on their own be? Rather, each of them will be on its own and pure, and the things that 
have been mixed together will not destroy them. But how is this possible? We will discuss 
these points later.
The forward reference is to vi.2.19-20, to which I will now turn. Plotinus’ worry is that his analogy with 
mixture to describe the κοινωνία των γένων may be misleading, since according to the Peripatetic view 
of mixture, its ingredients are only present in it potentially, not actually .44 This will obviously not do as 
an explanation of how the Genera are present as the constituents of intelligible reality: they must be 
ontologically prior to, and thus in some sense exist independently of, that of which they are principles.^ 
In fact, Plotinus insists that a Genus must produce its species (10.37-39), which entails that it has actual 
existence prior to them.
Vi.2.19 begins, however, with a different but related question: how is it that the Genera combine to 
produce their species? Plotinus’ reply, as we saw in §3, is that they get their differentiae from each other, 
i.e. in the συμπλοκή είδων described in the Sophist .46 Rather than explaining what these differentiae are 
(presumably the contributions to each Idea from each Genus),^ he returns to the difficulty of 2.19-26 
(19.7-17):
...it is clear that it [each Genus] will get them [its differentiae] from these genera [the other 
- meeista genêl. by being added to them and combined with them and coming to be together 
with them. But when it came to be together with them, what it produced was this 
combination of all of them. How then do the other things that come after this combination 
exist? And how, since they are all genera, do they produce their species? How does Motion 
produce the species of Motion, Rest the species of Rest, and so forth? And here we must be 
careful to ensure that each genus does not collapse into its species, and that the genus does not 
become a mere predicate considered as existing only in its species, but that it is both in 
them48 and in itself, and that when it is mixed with them it also exists pure and unmixed, so 
that it is not destroyed by contributing in some other way to the essence of the species.^
These are the problems that we need to investigate.
The problem, then, is just the problem of how an intelligible Genus can be ontologically prior to its 
species, and yet help constitute them. How can this not be a mere contradiction in terms? It is this 
problem that is under discussion in the crucial and difficult argument that follows (19.18-20.29), and not, as 
some authors have thought, the problem of the origin of the Genera themselves.^O
^ T h a t is, he here accepts the Peripatetic rather than the Stoic view of mixture: cp. his discussion of 
mixture in ii.7.
■^This is the Platonist view of the seventh aporia of Metaphysics B, that the highest genera are the 
principles, and thus prior: cf. n.4 above. Cf. also 12.12-14.
46cf. n.34 above. Hence a Genus does not by itself produce its species. Hoppe thinks Plotinus 
contradicts himself at §19 init. (pp.77-78), because he has misunderstood the technical term οίκείαι 
διαφοραί, “proper differentiae”, at 10.38. It does not imply that the differentia belongs to its genus, only 
that it can only serve as a differentia of that genus. The ultimate origin of this concept is Metaphysics 19 
(cf. 1058a 36-37 with b22).
^R ecall that Plotinus elsewhere says that Ideas are constituted by their differentiae (vi.7.10,11-12).
^Reading <èv> ¿κείνοι? at 19.15 with Ficino.
49Pace Henry and Schwyzer’s note, ίλλω? here means “in another way than the one we have described”.
SOThus Gürtler (cf. his title, “The Origin of Genera”) and Hoppe (p.80). Cf. 19.10: how do the 
derivative Ideas posterior to the ‘mixture’ exist? Plotinus’ view concerning the origin of the Genera seems
(Note continued on next page)
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Plotinus proposes to attack this problem by using the example of intellect (19.18-23):
But since we said that the compound of all beings is each intellect, but that Being and 
Substance^ prior to its species and parts is also an intellect, we are saying that intellect as it 
is (ήδη) is posterior.^ Let us use this puzzle to further our investigation, and let us advance 
our understanding of what has been said by employing it as an example.
“Since we said...” refers to the preceding chapter, 18.12-15:
Intellect, since it is engaged in thinking Being and is the composite of all things, will not be 
one of the genera, and true Intellect is Being together with all the genera and consequently 
(ήδη ) is all beings, while Being by itse lf^  taken as merely one genus is an element of 
Intellect
Since Intellect as a whole is here denied to be one of the Genera, it cannot be an example of how a genus 
is prior to its species. But every Idea, both the Genera and derivative Ideas, is an intellect, though they are 
so in two different senses: the problem therefore is, how can intellect in one sense be prior to intellect in 
the other?54 This is recognizably the same problem, since it is the problem of how an intelligible whole 
can exist prior to the existence of its parts.55
This ‘example* of is further illustrated in §20 by an analogy between voO? or intellect and έττιστήμη, 
knowledge or science as it exists at the level of the soul (cf. Sophist 257cd). (The situation is complicated 
by the fact that the analogy is also itself an example of the genus-species relation.) Plotinus appeals to the 
interrelations of universal science, special sciences, and the theorems of the special sciences a number of 
times in the Enneads to illustrate points about the nature of nonsensible reality.56 What he wants to do 
here, let us recall, is show how each Genus can be related to its species in such a way as to both constitute 
it and be prior to it. Chapter 19 runs as follows: 5 7
Let us then conceive one^S intellect that is in no way in contact with any of the partial 
intellects nor active concerning any object whatever, so that it does not become a particular
to be that the rest of them are somehow generated from Being, as walking is from you (cf. 3.17-20), though 
Being cannot exist without them either (13.3,15.11). Presumably he relies hoe on the arguments of §§7-8.
51 Here probably Being = the Genus, Substance (ούσία) = the mixture of all the Genoa, as at ii.6.1 init.·. 
cf. n.33 above.
52i retain the Mss. text at 19.20, with Henry-Schwyzer’s OCT.
53Retaining μόνον at 18.14: again the reference is to the doctrine of ii.6.1 init.
54since Plotinus clearly distinguishes two senses of ‘intellect* here, the problem is not, pace Gürtler 
p.5, how Intellect can be prior to itself. Intellect itself is not a Genus (cf. §18). The puzzle Caporia') is 
rather, how can the ‘true’ or ‘complete’ sense of intellect, intellect completed by all its parts, i.e. the Genera 
(ό ζύμπα? voO? of 20.10) be the posterior signification of the term? As Gürtler notes, 20.23 ff. treats 
intellect as a genus: this probably shows that Plotinus is thinking of the application of the example to 
each Genus as an intellect containing particular intellects, Le. particular Ideas, within it.
5^The doctrine of intelligible reality as a ‘true whole’ that is prior to and produces its parts is mentioned 
in the next treatise, iii.7.4,9-15: cf. the note ad loc. in McGuire and Strange (above, n.38).
56At iv.9 [8] 5,8 ff., to illustrate how soul can be at once one thing and many individual souls. (The 
same point is illustrated at iv.8 [6] 3,12 ff. by the analogy of a genus containing a hierarchy of species.) 
At iv.3 [27] 2,24 and 50, a theorem as ‘part’ of a science. At vi.4 [22] 11.10-12 the presence of different 
sciences in the soul is an analogy for the co-presence of forms in participants. Finally, at v.9 [5] 6,3-7 and 
8,3-7, as here, the simultaneous co-presence of sciences in the soul illustrates the ‘Anaxagorean’ unity-in­
diversity of the Ideas in intellect.
57My translation of this chapter should be compared with Gurtler’s pp.5,6,8,9,10.
58\ΐέν at 20.1 marks the contrast with particular intellect
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intellect, as science is prior to its specific kinds, and a specific science is prior to the parts that 
are contained in it. Each science (πάσα),59 while identical with none of its parts, is the 
potency of all of them, while each of these is what it is in actuality, and in potency all of 
them, and this holds for the universal science as well: the specific sciences, which lie in 
potency in science as a whole, and then get to be partial, are in potency the whole of science.
For science is predicated of them as a whole.^O not a part of it. It must however exist on its 
own and unmixed. [10] So also we should say that the whole intellect exists in one way, i.e. 
the intellect that is prior to the particular intellects that are in act, and that the particular 
ones^l exist in another way: the partial intellects are constituted by everything, while the 
intellect that exists over all of them supplies what the particular intellects need, and is the 
potency of them and possesses them universally, while they on the other hand in themselves 
as partial intellects possess the universal intellect, as the particular science possesses science.
And we should say that the great intellect exists on its own, and the particular intellects exist 
in themselves too, and the partial intellects are embraced by the whole intellect and the whole 
intellect by the partial ones, each of them existing on its own as well as in another, and the 
whole intellect existing on its own as well as in them, [20] and all of them are in potency in 
the whole intellect existing on its own, while in act it is all of them at once, but potentially 
each one separately, and they on the other hand are in act what each of them is, and in potency 
the whole. Insofar as they are what they are said to be, each is in act what it is said to be, but 
qua being in genus the whole, it is in potency the whole. The whole, on the other hand, qua 
genus is the potency of all the species that fall under it, and is none of them in act, but all of 
them are present silently in it. But qua being what it is in act prior to its species, it is not 
one of the particulars. It is necessary, if the specific intellects are to exist in act, that the 
activity that comes from the whole intellect become the cause of this.
Plotinus is concerned to emphasize here: (1) the priority of universal science, i.e. science as concerned 
with no particular object (we are to think of metaphysics or dialectic, the science concerned with Being in 
general), to all the special sciences, concerned with particular subject-matters, as its species; (2) the relative 
independence of the special sciences, the fact that one can possess a special science without possessing any 
other or the universal science, (3) the fact that each special science is in potency science in general (since it 
is a science, an instance, in the case of this particular subject matter, of the knowledge of Being in 
general—a species of the genus knowledge—and hence implicidy involves knowledge of Being) and hence 
each of the others (since all knowledge is connected, and starting from one science one can come to know 
the others^); (4) finally, the application of the details of this analogy to the case of Intellect, and hence to 
the Genera of the intelligible world. Note that the relation between the universal science and special 
sciences in (1) is treated as analogous to the relation between a special science and its theorems. In (2) and 
(3), the analogy with a science and its theorems again holds, for one can think about one theorem without 
thinking of the others,63 yet one must know the others: this is very clearly stated at iv.9.5,13-26, where 
the implication is drawn, as here, that therefore the ‘part’ potentially identical to the ‘whole’ as well as to 
each other ‘part’. In fact, (3) is just the claim that the same sorts of relations hold in the case of the special
59so Gürtler p.5, following Beuder-Theiler and Armstrong: the reference is not to the universal science. 
But Gürtler fails to see that των èv μέρα in line S (which is neuter) must then refer to the ‘parts’ of a 
science mentioned in the previous line (i.e. the theorems of a special science): he also fails to take account 
of the μέν.,.δέ contrast in lines 4-5. This makes it certain that ούδέν των έν μέρα is a partitive 
genidve, rather than ούδέν being adverbial (parallel with line 1), as he takes it. Note that lines 14 and 
25-26 both assert that the genus is δύναμι? of its species.
60Cf. Sophist 257cd.
6 1 Reading ΔΕ ΕΚ[ΔΕΕΚ]ΑΣΤΟϊΣ at 20.11-12 (dittography). This yields the same sense as Igal’s 
emendation, accepted by Henry and Schwyzer in their OCT.
62This sort of interconnection of knowledge is an assumption, but a Platonic one. Note that the 
application of this to the Ideas helps explain what is meant at v.8.4,11.
63cf. v.9.6,5-6: “each kind of knowledge does its own work when the need arises without dragging in 
(οΰ συνεφέλκουσα) the others” (transi. Armstrong).
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sciences vis-à-vis each other and the universal science. This point is absolutely fundamental to Plotinus’ 
argument: for he must insist that the contents of Intellect, like the sciences, are potentially the same thing 
as one another else Intellect will not be, as he claims, both one —in effect, a single individual—and 
many.
(1) represents Plotinus’ main claim in the passage. The universal is prior to its species: it is 
independent of them (one can possess the universal science without being expert in the special sciences), 
while they, as instances of knowledge, presuppose it; it is capable of producing them all (knowledge of 
universal science can lead to the discovery of special sciences), hence it is δύναμι? πάντων, the power of 
all of them, and potentially (δυνάμει) each of them separately. But further, Plotinus claims, it is already 
actually all of them together. This is claimed about Intellect at lines 21-22 (ένεργείςι δνη  τά πάντα 
άμα, δυνάμει δέ έκαστον χωρί?), but is clearly supposed to be inferred from its application to the case 
of science. The claim is that the knower of universal science already actually knows everything, but in a 
universal way (cf. Metaphysics E l, 1026a30-31: first philosophy—identified by Plotinus with Platonic 
dialectic in i.3.4-5—is καθόλου οϋτω? δτι πρώτη). Hence, since the analogy with the case of science is 
supposed to fit Intellect in detail, universal intelligible knowledge (of a Genus) is both prior to and helps 
constitute the knowledge of its species.
Lloyd (1986, p.265) presents as star evidence for his claim that the knowledge belonging to pure or 
higher intellect is simple the claim of vi.2.3,21-32 that it is our conceptions (έπινοΐςι) that are responsible 
for dividing it up into different Ideas. We are now in a position to understand this passage (and the 
corresponding one at v.9.8 fin .·9 init.) in a different way. TTie knowledge of pure intellect corresponds to 
the universal science. Its object is nevertheless complex, just as the universal science is knowledge of the 
most general propositions about Being: in fact its object is just what Plotinus calls the ‘mixture’ of the 
megista genê of the Sophist. The dividing up of this ‘mixture’ by our conceptions or our intellects is the 
articulation of Being into particular derivative Ideas, corresponding in Plotinus’ analogy to the knowledge of 
the special sciences. Each particular Idea is a way in which our intellects can know intelligible reality. As 
Plotinus sometimes says, the content of intellect essentially is a multiplicity of δυνάμει? or powers 
(iii.7.3, 5-9; vi.2.21,7-8, especially iv.4.1,33-36, on the way that soul knows different Ideas). These 
powers are just the different Ideas, and they are really different as powers. They are the capacities for 
Intellect’s becoming known by us. (This alleviates Smith’s worry about the seriousness of Plotinus’ use 
of the notion of potency in vi.2.20.) Hence Intellect does contain a real multiplicity of intelligible objects, 
as Plato had claimed. Moreover, the thesis of vi.2.20,21 (ένεργείφ δντι τά πάντα άμα) is that this 
multiplicity of objects ‘already’ exists in act in a universal way in the thought of the higher intellect.
